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Abstract
For the Tardos traitor tracing scheme, we show that by combining the symbol-symmetric accusation
function of ˇSkoric´ et al. with the improved analysis of Blayer and Tassa we get further improvements.
Our construction gives codes that are up to 4 times shorter than Blayer and Tassa’s, and up to 2 times
shorter than the codes from ˇSkoric´ et al. Asymptotically, we achieve the theoretical optimal codelength
for Tardos’ distribution function and the symmetric score function. For large coalitions, our codelengths
are asymptotically about 4.93% of Tardos’ original codelengths, which also improves upon results from
Nuida et al.
1 Introduction
Watermarking digital content allows distributors of copyrighted digital data to embed so-called fingerprints
into their data in such a way that each copy of the data can be uniquely identified. These watermarks are
made in a robust way, so that users cannot change or remove them from the content. If a copy of the
data is then illegally distributed to unauthorized users and intercepted by the distributor, he can extract the
fingerprint from the copy and find the person whose fingerprinted data was distributed. Actions can then
be taken against this user, to prevent further illegal distribution.
To be able to trace the watermarked data back to the user, we need that the embedded fingerprints
for each user are different. However, by comparing their differently watermarked copies of the content,
multiple malicious users can form a coalition and detect differences in their content. Assuming that besides
the watermarks all copies are the same, this allows coalitions to detect part of the watermark. By editing
this data, they can then create a forged copy, which contains the same digital content as their original copies,
but has a forged fingerprint that cannot be traced back to them directly. Under the marking assumption,
which says that colluders can only detect and edit fingerprint positions if their fingerprints do not all match
on that position, there are ways to construct fingerprinting schemes such that any forged copy can be traced
back to at least one of the colluders. This involves finding a construction for fingerprints for each of the
users, and finding a way to trace back forged copies to guilty users.
1.1 Model
Let U = {1, . . . ,n} denote the set of the n users that received watermarked content. Here a user corresponds
to one watermarked copy of the content, so a person who possesses several differently watermarked copies
of the data is assumed to control multiple users. For each user j the distributor generates a fingerprint (also
called a codeword), which is usually denoted by~x j. This codeword is a vector of length ℓ (the codelength)
of symbols from an alphabet Q of size q. The case q = 2 corresponds to the binary alphabet, which is
usually taken as Q = {0,1}. All fingerprints together form the fingerprinting code C = {~x1, . . . ,~xn}. A
common way of representing this code is by putting all codewords as rows in a matrix X according to
X ji = (~x j)i.
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After assigning codewords to users and distributing the watermarked copies, a subset C ⊆U of c users
(called colluders or pirates) may form a coalition to create a forged copy. Using some pirate strategy ρ , a
function Qℓ×c →Qℓ, they construct a forged copy, which has some unknown distorted fingerprint ρ(X) =~y
called the forgery. For the pirate strategy ρ , we assume that the marking assumption holds, i.e. if for all
j ∈ C the pirates have (~x j)i = ω for some position i and symbol ω ∈ Q, then the coalition is forced to
output yi = ω . On other positions, we assume that colluders are free to choose any of the symbols from the
alphabet.
Finally, after the coalition has created a forged copy, we assume the distributor intercepts it and extracts
the forgery~y from the data. He then runs some tracing algorithm σ on the forgery, to get a subset σ(~y)⊆U
of users that are accused. The accusation is said to be successful if no innocent users are accused (i.e.
σ(~y)⊆C) and at least one guilty user is accused (i.e. σ(~y)∩C 6= /0).
In the setting of probabilistic schemes, the code X and the tracing algorithm σ may depend on some
random variables. The events of not accusing any innocent users (soundness) and accusing at least one
guilty user (completeness) then also depend on these random variables. Then, instead of demanding that
a fingerprinting scheme is always sound and complete, we may demand that the probability of failure is
bounded by some small value ε , where the probability is taken over these random variables. This leads to
the following definitions of ε1-soundness and ε2-completeness.
Definition 1 (Soundness and completeness). Let C ⊆U be a coalition of size at most c, and let ρ be some
pirate strategy employed by this coalition. Then a traitor tracing scheme (X ,σ) is called ε1-sound if
P[σ(ρ(X)) 6⊆C]≤ ε1.
Similarly, a fingerprinting scheme is called ε2-complete if
P[σ(ρ(X))∩C = /0]≤ ε2.
As we will see later, ε1/n and ε2 are closely related in the Tardos fingerprinting scheme. Therefore it is
convenient to introduce the notation η = log(ε2)/ log(ε1/n) such that ε2 = (ε1/n)η , which describes how
big ε2 is, compared to ε1/n. Also, we sometimes simply say a scheme is secure, to denote that it is sound
and complete for certain (implicit) parameters ε1 and ε2.
1.2 Related work
In [8], Tardos investigated probabilistic binary fingerprinting schemes where small margins of error are
allowed. He proved that a codelength of ℓ = Ω(c2 ln(n/ε1)) is necessary to achieve soundness and com-
pleteness, while in the same paper he also gave a construction with a codelength of ℓ = 100c2 ln(n/ε1).
This construction is often referred to as the Tardos scheme. In [1, 3] the lower bound on the codelength
was further tightened, to show that one needs ℓ ≥ 2ln(2)c2 ln(n/ε1) for sufficiently large c and q = 2, to
achieve soundness and completeness.
Since the scheme of Tardos had a constant 100 in front of the c2 ln(n/ε1) in the codelength, many papers
focused on constructing a scheme with the same order codelength, but with a smaller constant. For example,
using a discrete distribution function in the Tardos scheme, Nuida et al. showed in [5] that one can achieve
codelengths of ℓ < 5c2 ln(n/ε1) in some cases with small c, while for large c they achieved an asymptotic
codelength of ℓ ≈ 5.35c2 ln(n/ε1). Using a different approach, Amiri and Tardos showed in [1] that with
a computation-heavy construction, one can approach the theoretical lower bound of ℓ = 2ln(2)c2 ln(n/ε1)
for large c.
In this paper we will focus on the binary Tardos scheme with the arcsine distribution function from [8],
which was introduced in [8] and further analyzed and improved in e.g. [2, 5–7]. We will focus on two
improvements in particular. In [2], Blayer and Tassa made the proofs of [8] tighter by introducing several
auxiliary variables which were to be optimized later, instead of fixing them in advance. In that paper the
construction of the Tardos scheme essentially remained the same, but it was shown that a codelength of
ℓ = 85c2 ln(n/ε1) is also sufficient to prove soundness and completeness. In [6], ˇSkoric´ et al. did change
the scheme, by making the score function of the Tardos scheme symbol-symmetric. This also lead to
shorter codelengths, giving asymptotic codelengths of ℓ = (pi2 + o(1))c2 ln(n/ε1) ≈ 9.87c2 ln(n/ε1) for
2
large c, while maintaining soundness and completeness. Furthermore assuming that the scores of innocent
users and the joint coalition score are normally distributed, ˇSkoric´ et al. showed in [6, Section 6] that an
asymptotic codelength of ℓ = (pi22 + o(1))c
2 ln(n/ε1) is then both sufficient and necessary. Since by the
Central Limit Theorem these scores will in fact converge to normal distributions for asymptotically large
c, this also provides a lower bound on the codelength, when using the arcsine distribution function and the
symmetric score function.
1.3 Contributions and outline
Combining the symbol-symmetric score function from ˇSkoric´ et al. with Blayer and Tassa’s sharp anal-
ysis, we will prove ε1-soundness and ε2-completeness for all c ≥ 2 and η ≤ 1 with a codelength of
ℓ = 23.79c2 ln(n/ε1). This improves upon the codelength from Blayer and Tassa by a factor more than
3.5, and it improves upon the original Tardos scheme by a factor of more than 4. Furthermore, for bigger
c and smaller η the constant in front of the c2 ln(n/ε1) in ℓ further decreases, easily leading to a factor 10
improvement over the original Tardos scheme and a factor slightly less than 4 improvement over the Blayer
and Tassa analysis.
Similar to work of ˇSkoric´ et al., we also look at the asymptotics of our scheme, and show that for
large c, we can prove soundness and completeness for a codelength of ℓ = (pi22 +O(c
−1/3))c2 ln(n/ε1) ≈
4.93c2 ln(n/ε1). This improves upon the asymptotic results from ˇSkoric´ et al. by a factor 2, and we achieve
the asymptotic optimal codelength which ˇSkoric´ et al. proved to be sufficient and necessary under the added
assumption that the distributions of scores are normal distributions. We therefore close the gap of a factor
2 between the best known provably secure codelength and the asymptotic optimal codelength, for Tardos’
original arcsine distribution function and the symmetric score function. These results also improve upon
the asymptotic codelengths from Nuida et al., who used different discrete distribution functions, by more
than 7%.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we first give the construction of the (symmetric) Tardos
scheme, and compare our results with earlier results from literature. In Sections 3 and 4 we then prove that
the soundness and completeness properties hold under our assumptions on the parameters. In Section 5
we then give results similar to those in [2, Section 2.4.5] on how to find the optimal set of parameters that
satisfies the conditions for our proof method to work, and minimizes the codelength. There we also give
such minimal codelengths, for several values of c and η . Finally in Section 6 we prove the results stated
above for asymptotically large c, and show that the optimal rate of convergence is of order O(c−1/3).
This paper is mainly based on results from the first author’s Master’s thesis [4].
2 Construction and results
First we present the construction of the Tardos traitor tracing scheme, as in [2], where we use auxiliary
variables dℓ,dz,dδ for the codelength ℓ, accusation offset Z and cutoff parameter δ respectively. The only
difference between our construction and that of Blayer and Tassa is in the score function we use. While
Blayer and Tassa used the asymmetric score function from Tardos’ original scheme, we use the symbol-
symmetric score function from ˇSkoric´ et al.
2.1 The Tardos traitor tracing scheme
Let n≥ c≥ 2 be positive integers, and let ε1,ε2 ∈ (0,1) be the desired upper bounds for the soundness and
completeness error probabilities respectively. Let us write k = ln(n/ε1) so that e−k = ε1/n. Let dℓ,dz,dδ
be positive constants, with dδ > 1. Then the symmetric Tardos fingerprinting scheme works as follows.
1. Initialization
(a) Take the codelength as ℓ= dℓc2k. 1
1Note that ℓ may not be integral, while the codelength of a code of course has to be integral. See Appendix A for a short note on
how to solve this minor problem in our construction.
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(b) Take the accusation offset parameter as Z = dzck.
(c) Take the cutoff parameter as δ = 1/(dδ c), and compute δ ′ = arcsin(
√
δ ) such that 0 < δ ′ <
pi/4.
(d) For each fingerprint position 1≤ i≤ ℓ, select pi ∈ [δ ,1−δ ] independently from the distribution
defined by the following CDF F(p) and PDF f (p):
F(p) =
2arcsin(√p)− 2δ ′
pi− 4δ ′ , f (p) =
1
(pi− 4δ ′)
√
p(1− p) . (1)
The function f (p) is biased towards δ and 1− δ and symmetric around 1/2.
2. Codeword generation
(a) For each position 1 ≤ i≤ ℓ and for each user 1 ≤ j ≤ n, select the ith entry of the codeword of
user j according to P[X ji = 1] = pi and P[X ji = 0] = 1− pi.
3. Accusation
(a) For each position 1 ≤ i ≤ ℓ and for each user 1 ≤ j ≤ n, calculate the score S ji according to:
S ji =

+
√
(1− pi)/pi if X ji = 1,yi = 1,
−
√
pi/(1− pi) if X ji = 0,yi = 1,
−
√
(1− pi)/pi if X ji = 1,yi = 0,
+
√
pi/(1− pi) if X ji = 0,yi = 0.
(2)
(b) For each user 1 ≤ j ≤ n, calculate the total accusation sum S j = ∑ℓi=1 S ji. User j is accused if
and only if S j > Z.
Under certain conditions on the parameters dℓ,dz,dδ , which are specified in Subsections 2.2 and 2.3,
one can prove soundness and completeness, using (a modified version of) Tardos’ proof construction. Note
that, since this proof method uses several non-tight bounds, it is very well possible that there exist sets of
parameters that do not satisfy these conditions, but still guarantee soundness and completeness. So if the
conditions are not satisfied, we can only conclude that the proof method does not work in that case.
2.2 Results for the asymmetric Tardos scheme
In the original Tardos scheme, and in several papers discussing the Tardos scheme, the score function
is asymmetric in yi, as only the positions with yi = 1 are taken into account for the accusations. The
construction of this asymmetric Tardos scheme is the same as in Subsection 2.1, but with the scores from
(2) replaced by:
S ji =

+
√
(1− pi)/pi if X ji = 1,yi = 1,
−
√
pi/(1− pi) if X ji = 0,yi = 1,
0 otherwise.
(3)
Blayer and Tassa performed an extensive analysis of this scheme in [2], and showed that under the following
assumptions, one can prove soundness and completeness for given c and η . In these Theorems, the function
h−1 : (0,∞)→ ( 12 ,∞) is defined by h−1(x) = (ex−1−x)/x2, while the function h : ( 12 ,∞)→ (0,∞) denotes
its inverse function as in [2], so that ex ≤ 1+ x+λ x2 for all x≤ h(λ ).
Theorem 1. [2, Theorem 1.1] Let the Tardos scheme be constructed as in Subsection 2.1, but with the
asymmetric score function from (3). Let dα ,r be positive constants, with r > 12 , such that dℓ,dz,dδ ,dα and
r satisfy the following two requirements:
dα ≥
√
dδ
h(r)
√
c
, (S1)
dz
dα
− rdℓd2α
≥ 1. (S2)
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Then the scheme is ε1-sound.
Theorem 2. [2, Theorem 1.2] Let the Tardos scheme be constructed as in Subsection 2.1, but with the
asymmetric score function from (3). Let s,g be positive constants such that dℓ,dz,dδ ,s and g satisfy the
following two requirements:
1− 2dδ
pi
− h
−1(s)s√
dδ c
≥ g, (C1)
gdℓ− dz ≥ η
√
dδ
s2c
. (C2)
Then the scheme is ε2-complete.
Tardos’ original choice of parameters was the following, which allowed him to prove his scheme is
ε1-sound and ε2-complete for all c≥ 2 and η ≤
√
c/4 [8, Theorems 1 and 2]:
dℓ = 100, dz = 20, dδ = 300, dα = 10, r = 1, s = 1, g =
1
4
.
Blayer and Tassa proved that to achieve ε1-soundness and ε2-completeness for all c ≥ 2 and η ≤ 1, the
following choice of parameters is also provably secure [2, Section 2.4]:
dℓ = 85, dz = 15, dδ = 40, dα = 8, r = 0.611, s = 0.757, g = 0.2461.
In [7, Corollary 1], ˇSkoric´ et al. showed that the following choice of parameters suffices to prove soundness
and completeness for asymptotically large c:
dℓ → 4pi2, dz → 4pi , dδ → ∞, dα → 2pi , r = 1, s = h(1), g →
1
pi
.
According to the Central Limit Theorem, the scores of innocent users and the total score of the coalition
converge to certain normal distributions. Under the assumption that the scores behave exactly like these
normal distributions, ˇSkoric´ et al. showed in [7, Corollary 3] that the following choice of parameters is then
sufficient and necessary to prove soundness and completeness:
dℓ → 2pi2, dz → 2pi , dδ → ∞.
Applying the analysis from Section 6 to the asymmetric Tardos scheme, we can prove that the following
choice of parameters is provably sufficient for large c:2
dℓ → 2pi2, dz → 2pi , dδ → ∞, dα → pi , r →
1
2
, s→ ∞, g → 1
pi
.
So with Blayer and Tassa’s proof construction, we obtain a 2 times shorter asymptotic codelength compared
to the shortest provable codelength of ˇSkoric´ et al. for the asymmetric Tardos scheme, and we achieve the
asymptotic optimal codelength for the asymmetric Tardos scheme which ˇSkoric´ et al. only achieved when
they added the assumption that scores behave like normal distributions.
2.3 Results for the symmetric Tardos scheme
We will prove in Sections 3 and 4 that with the following assumptions on the parameters, we can also prove
soundness and completeness for the symmetric Tardos scheme.
Theorem 3. Let the Tardos scheme be constructed as in Subsection 2.1, and let dα ,r be positive constants,
with r > 12 , such that dℓ,dz,dδ ,dα and r satisfy the requirements from (S1) and (S2). Then the scheme is
ε1-sound.
2These results can be obtained by applying the analysis from Section 6 to Blayer and Tassa’s original analysis for the asymmetric
Tardos scheme. The main difference is that then one needs g = 1pi + o(1) instead of g =
2
pi + o(1), which causes an extra factor 4 for
dℓ and extra factors 2 for dz and dα .
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Theorem 4. Let the Tardos scheme be constructed as in Subsection 2.1, and let s,g be positive constants,
such that dℓ,dz,dδ ,s and g satisfy (C2) and the following requirement:
2− 4dδ
pi
− h
−1(s)s√
dδ c
≥ g. (C1’)
Then the scheme is ε2-complete.
Using the above results, in Section 5 we will prove ε1-soundness and ε2-completeness for all c≥ 2 and
η ≤ 1 for the following set of parameters:
dℓ = 23.79, dz = 8.06, dδ = 28.31, dα = 4.58, r = 0.67, s = 1.07, g = 0.49.
This improves upon the constants from Blayer and Tassa by a factor more than 3.5, and it improves upon
the original Tardos scheme by a factor more than 4. Furthermore, for bigger c and smaller η the values of
dℓ further decrease, easily leading to a factor 10 improvement over the original Tardos scheme.
ˇSkoric´ et al. showed that for asymptotically large c, the following set of parameters is sufficient for
proving soundness and completeness in the symmetric Tardos scheme [6, Corollary 1]:
dℓ → pi2, dz → 2pi , dδ → ∞, dα → pi , r = 1, s = h(1), g →
2
pi
.
With the added assumption that the scores of innocent users and the joint score of guilty users are normally
distributed, ˇSkoric´ et al. also showed that the following set of parameters is sufficient for soundness and
completeness, for asymptotically large c [6, Corollary 2]:
dℓ → pi
2
2
, dz → pi , dδ → ∞.
Since by the Central Limit Theorem these scores will also converge to normal distributions, this shows that
the asymptotic optimal codelength for the symmetric Tardos scheme is ℓ = (pi22 + o(1))c
2 ln(n/ε1). We
show in Section 6 that for asymptotically large c, we can actually prove soundness and completeness for
this optimal codelength, without any added assumptions. In the asymptotic case of c→∞, our construction
gives the following parameters:
dℓ → pi
2
2
, dz → pi , dδ → ∞, dα →
pi
2
, r → 1
2
, s → ∞, g → 2
pi
.
Similar to the asymmetric case, we thus get a factor 2 improvement over ˇSkoric´ et al.’s best provable
asymptotic codelength, and we achieve the asymptotic optimal codelength which ˇSkoric´ et al. only proved
with the added assumption that the scores behave like normal distributions. This also improves upon
results from Nuida et al. in [5], who showed that with certain discrete distribution functions F , one can
prove soundness and completeness for ℓ ≈ 5.35c2 ln(n/ε1) for large c. With our construction, we show a
codelength of ℓ≈ 4.93c2 ln(n/ε1) is provably secure for large c.
3 Soundness
Here we will prove Theorem 3, i.e. prove the soundness property from Definition 1, under the assumptions
(S1) and (S2). We will closely follow the proof of soundness of Blayer and Tassa of [2, Theorem 1.1]. We
will first prove an upper bound on E
[
eαS j
]
, with α = 1/(dαc) and using only (S1), and then use this result
together with (S2) to prove upper bounds on P[ j ∈ σ(~y)] for innocent users j, and P[σ(ρ(X)) 6⊆C].
Lemma 1. Let dα and r be positive constants, with r > 12 , such that dδ ,dα and r satisfy Equation (S1).
Let j be an innocent user, and let S j be the user’s score in the Tardos scheme from Subsection 2.1. Let
α = 1/(dαc). Then
E~y,X ,~p
[
eαS j
]≤ e+rα2ℓ. (4)
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Proof. First we fill in S j = ∑ℓi=1 S ji and use that S j does not depend on X j′i for j′ 6= j to get
E~y,X ,~p
[
eαS j
]
= E~y,~X j ,~p
[
ℓ
∏
i=1
eαS ji
]
=
ℓ
∏
i=1
Eyi,X ji ,pi
[
eαS ji
]
.
Since S ji <
√
1/δ =√dδ c it follows that αS ji <
√
dδ/(dα
√
c). From (S1) we know that √dδ/(dα
√
c)≤
h(r) for our choice of r, hence αS ji < h(r). From the definition of h we know that ex ≤ 1+ x+ rx2 exactly
when x≤ h(r). Using this with x = αS ji we get
E
[
eαS ji
]≤ E [1+αS ji+ r(αS ji)2]= 1+αE[S ji]+ rα2E[S2ji].
We can easily calculate E[S ji] and E[S2ji], as yi and X ji are independent for innocent users j. As in [6,
Lemmas 2 and 3], we obtain
E[S ji] = 0, E[S2ji] = 1. (5)
So it follows that E
[
eαS ji
]≤ 1+ rα2 ≤ erα2 , and E~y,X ,~p [eαS j]≤ erα2ℓ, which was to be proven.
Theorem 3. We prove that the probability of accusing any particular innocent user is at most ε1/n. Since
there are at most n innocent users, the probability of not accusing any innocent users is then at least
(1− ε1/n)n ≥ 1− ε1, which then proves the scheme is ε1-sound.
Since a user is accused if and only if his score S j exceeds Z, we need to prove that P[S j > Z] ≤ ε1/n
for innocent users j. First of all, we write α = 1/(dαc), and we use the Markov inequality and Lemma 1
to obtain
P[ j ∈ σ(~y)] = P[S j > Z] = P
[
eαS j > eαZ
]≤ e−αZE [eαS j]≤ e−αZ+rα2ℓ.
Since we want to prove that P[ j ∈ σ(~y)]≤ ε1/n, the proof would be complete if e−αZ+rα2ℓ ≤ e−k ≤ ε1/n,
i.e. if −αZ + rα2ℓ≤ −k. Filling in α = 1/(dαc),Z = dzck and ℓ= dℓc2k, and dividing both sides by −k,
we get
dz
dα
− rdℓd2α
≥ 1.
This is exactly inequality (S2), which was assumed to hold. This completes the proof.
Compared to the original proof in [2], this proof has barely changed. The only difference is that now
the scores are counted for all positions i, instead of only those positions where yi = 1. However, since in
the proof in [2] this number of positions was bounded by ℓ, the result remains the same. This explains why
we can prove ε1-soundness with the symmetric score function under the same assumptions (S1), (S2) as
in [2].
4 Completeness
For the proof of Theorem 4, we will again closely follow the proof of Blayer and Tassa of [2, Theorem
1.2], and make changes where necessary to incorporate the symbol-symmetric score function. We first give
a Lemma to bound the expectation value of E~y,X ,~p
[
e−β S
]
with β = s√δ/c and S = ∑ j∈C S j, and then use
this Lemma to prove completeness.
Lemma 2. Let s and g be positive constants such that dδ ,s and g satisfy (C1’). Let β = s
√
δ/c, let C be a
coalition of size c, and let S = ∑ j∈C S j be their total coalition score in the Tardos scheme from Subsection
2.1. Then
E~y,X ,~p
[
e−β S
]
≤ e−gβ ℓ. (6)
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The proof of Lemma 2 is quite lengthy and can be found in Appendix B. Using this Lemma we can
easily prove Theorem 4.
Theorem 4. We will prove that for a coalition of size c, with probability at least 1− ε2 the algorithm will
accuse at least one of the colluders. Note that if no colluders are accused, then the score of each colluder
is below Z. Hence if the total coalition score S exceeds cZ, then at least one of the pirates is accused. So to
prove ε2-soundness, it suffices to prove that P[S < cZ]≤ ε2.
We first use the Markov inequality and Lemma 2 with β = s√δ/c > 0 to get
P[σ(~y)∩C = /0]≤ P[S < cZ] = P
[
e−β S > e−β cZ
]
≤ eβ cZE~y,X ,~p
[
e−β S
]
≤ eβ cZ−gβ ℓ.
Since we want to prove that P[S< cZ]≤ e−ηk ≤ (ε1/n)η = ε2, the proof would be complete if β cZ−gβ ℓ≤
−ηk. Filling in β = s√δ/c, ℓ= dℓc2k,Z = dzck,δ = 1/(dδ c) and writing out both sides, we get
gdℓ− dz ≥ η
√
dδ
s2c
.
This is exactly inequality (C2), which was assumed to hold. This completes the proof.
Compared to [2], we see that instead of using (C1), we now need that inequality (C1’) holds. Comparing
these two inequalities, we see that a term 1pi has changed to a
2
pi , and a term
2
dδ pi
has changed to a 4dδ pi . The
most important change is the 1pi changing to a
2
pi , since that term is the most dominant factor (and the only
positive term) on the left hand side of (C1’). By increasing this by a factor 2, we get that g ≤ 2pi instead
of g ≤ 1pi . Especially for large c, this will play an important role, and it will basically be the reason why
the required codelength can then be reduced by a factor 4, compared to Blayer and Tassa’s analysis for the
asymmetric scheme.
While the other change (the 2dδ pi changing to
4
dδ pi
) does not have a big impact on the optimal choice of
parameters for large c, this change does influence the required codelength for smaller c. Because of this
change, we now subtract more from the left hand side of (C1’), so that the value of g is bounded sharper
from above. This means that for finite c we cannot reduce the codelength of Blayer and Tassa by a factor
4, but only by a factor slightly less than 4.
Finally, after using (C1’) in the proof above, the analysis remained the same as in [2]. So under the
same assumption (C2) as in [2], we could also complete the proof for the symmetric Tardos scheme.
5 Optimization
Similar to the analysis done by Blayer and Tassa in [2, Section 2.4], we also investigate the optimal choice
of parameters such that all requirements are satisfied, and dℓ is minimized. As only one of the inequalities
has changed, and it changed only on two positions, the formulas for the optimal values of dδ ,dα ,dz,dℓ in
the following Theorem are almost the same as in [2, Section 2.4.5]. We do not give a proof here, as it would
be nearly identical to the analysis done in [2, Section 2.4].
Theorem 5. Let η ,c be given, and let r,s,g be fixed, satisfying r ∈ ( 12 ,∞),s ∈ (0,∞),g ∈ (0, 2pi ). Then the
optimal choice of dδ ,dα ,dz,dℓ, minimizing dℓ and satisfying conditions (S1),(S2),(C1’),(C2), is given by:
ˆdδ =
(
1
4
pi − 2g
(√
(h−1(s)s)2
c
+
16
pi
(
2
pi
− g
)
+
h−1(s)s√
c
))2
, (O1)
ˆdα = max

√
ˆdδ
h(r)
√
c
,
r
g
+
√√√√( r
g
)2
+
r
g
η
√
ˆdδ
s2c
 , (O2)
ˆdz =
g ˆd2α + rη
√
ˆdδ
s2c
g ˆdα − r
, (O3)
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ˆdℓ =
η
√
ˆdδ
s2c
+ ˆdz
g
. (O4)
So to find the optimal septuple (rˆ, sˆ, gˆ, ˆdδ , ˆdα , ˆdz, ˆdℓ) for given c,η , satisfying all requirements and
minimizing ˆdℓ, one only has to find the triple (r,s,g) with r∈ ( 12 ,∞),s∈ (0,∞) and g∈ (0, 2pi ) that minimizes
the right hand side of (O4).
Example An optimal solution to (S1),(S2),(C1’),(C2) for c≥ 2 and η = 1, minimizing dℓ, is given by
dℓ = 23.79, dz = 8.06, dδ = 28.31, dα = 4.58, r = 0.67, s = 1.07, g = 0.49.
This means that with these constants, we can prove soundness and completeness for all c ≥ 2 and η ≤
1, with a codelength of ℓ = 23.79c2 ln(n/ε1). Compared to the original Tardos scheme, which had a
codelength of ℓ = 100c2 ⌈ln(n/ε1)⌉, this gives an improvement of a factor more than 4. Furthermore we
can prove that this scheme is ε1-sound and ε2-complete for any value of c ≥ 2 and η ≤ 1, while Tardos’
original proof only works for c ≥ 2 and η ≤√c/4.
Example In practice, one usually has η ≪ 1 instead of η = 1. For example, it could be that ε2 = 1/2 is
sufficient, while ε1 = 10−3 is desired and there are n= 106 users, so that η ≈ 0.033. Then the optimizations
give us dℓ ≈ 10.89 for c = 2. So with this larger value of ε2, a codelength of ℓ = 10.89c2 ln(n/ε1) is
sufficient to prove the soundness and completeness properties for any c ≥ 2. This is then already a factor
more than 9 improvement compared to the original Tardos scheme.
If we let c increase in inequalities (O1),(O2),(O3),(O4), i.e. if we only want provable soundness and
completeness for c≥ c0 for some c0 > 2, then one can easily see that the inequalities become weaker and
5 10 50 100 500 1000
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Figure 1: Optimal values of dℓ, for several values of c between 2 and 1000. The different lines correspond to the cases
η = 1,0.5,0.2,0.1,0.01 respectively, where higher values of η correspond to higher values of ˆdℓ.
an even shorter codelength can be achieved. Figure 1 shows the optimal values of dℓ against different values
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of c, for several values of η . One can see that for large c, a codelength of ℓ < 6c2 ln(n/ε1) can be sufficient.
In the next Section, we will see that for large c, the optimal values of dℓ will converge to pi
2
2 ≈ 4.93.
6 Asymptotics
Here we show that with the symmetric Tardos construction, for c → ∞ we can prove soundness and com-
pleteness for dℓ = pi
2
2 +O
(
c−1/3
)
. We calculate the optimal first order error term explicitly, and also show
explicitly the dependence on η , as the choice of η may depend on the particular application. Note that at
least η ≤ 1, but it may be considerably smaller and it may depend on c as well.
Theorem 6. Let γ =
( 2
3pi
)2/3 ≈ 0.35577. The optimal asymptotic (for c→∞) value for dℓ, and the accom-
panying values for dz,dδ , are
dℓ =
pi2
2
(
1+
(
3γ + 18γ η
logc
(1+ o(1))
)
c−1/3
)
, (7)
dz = pi
(
1+
(
5
2
γ + 6γ η
logc
(1+ o(1))
)
c−1/3
)
, (8)
dδ =
4
γ
(
1− 3 η
logc
(1+ o(1))
)
c1/3, (9)
and the choices for g,r,s leading to them are given by
g =
2
pi
(
1−
(
1
2
γ + 3γ η
logc
(1+ o(1))
)
c−1/3
)
, (10)
r =
1
2
(
1+
(
2γ − 6γ η
logc
(1+ o(1))
)
c−1/3
)
, (11)
s = log
(
24
pi2γ
η
logc (1+ o(1))c
1/3
)
. (12)
We have optimized for dℓ, and one could get slightly better error terms for dz or dδ . For example,
optimizing for dz yields an optimal value of pi(1+(3γ ′+ 9γ ′ ηlogc (1+ o(1)))c−1/3), for a suboptimal dℓ of
pi2
2 (1+(4γ ′+ 15γ ′
η
logc (1+ o(1)))c
−1/3), where γ ′ = 2−1/3γ .
It is remarkable that the error terms for dℓ and dz scale with c−1/3, while ˇSkoric´ et al. found error terms
scaling with c−1/2. It turns out that in [6] an error term in µ˜ was not taken into account, and if one does do,
their analysis for the binary case will also yield error terms scaling with c−1/3. Also note that dδ (related
to the cutoff) scales with c1/3, i.e. the cutoff 1dδ c scales with c
−4/3 rather than with c−1 as one might have
guessed.
An immediate consequence of Theorem 6 is the following result, which shows that asymptotically we
will achieve codelengths of ℓ ≈ 4.93c2 ln(n/ε1), i.e. codelengths that are about 4.93% of Tardos’ original
codelengths.
Corollary 1. For c→∞ the above construction gives an ε1-sound and ε2-complete scheme with parameters
ℓ→ pi
2
2
c2 ln(n/ε1), Z → pic ln(n/ε1), δ → γ4c
−4/3.
This proves that our analysis is asymptotically tight, since for large c we achieve the optimal codelength
of ℓ= (pi22 + o(1))c
2 ln(n/ε1).
Remark In the proof of Theorem 6, we use that r can be taken in the neighborhood of 12 to get the final
result, dℓ = pi
2
2 +O(c
−1/3). In [6] however, no such variable r was used, as it was simply fixed at 1. If they
had taken r as a parameter in their analysis and had taken it close to 12 in the asymptotic case, then they
would have obtained the same asymptotic results as we did above, but still with different first order terms.
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A Integral codelengths
One detail we have not taken care of and which is often ”swept under the carpet” in other literature, is that the
codelength ℓ by definition has to be integral. In the construction of the Tardos scheme however, we said we take
ℓ= dℓc2 ln(n/ε1), while ln(n/ε1) and dℓ may not be integral. To solve the problem of non-integral codelengths, Tardos
rounded up ln(n/ε1) and took dℓ = 100 in his original scheme. Blayer and Tassa also rounded up ln(n/ε1) and took
dℓ = 85, presumably also to guarantee that ℓ is integral3. However, rounding up dℓ and ln(n/ε1) could drastically in-
crease the codelength. For example, suppose n= 106, ε1 = ε2 = 0.01, and c= 25. Then η = 0.25 and ln(n/ε1)≈ 18.42,
and numerical optimizations give dℓ ≈ 8.18. Without rounding we would get a codelength of ℓ ≈ 94155, while with
rounding we get ℓ′ = 106875. So then the codelength ℓ′ is more than 13.5% higher than ℓ, only because we rounded
up both ln(n/ε1) and dℓ.
Instead of rounding up inbetween, rounding up the entire codelength to ℓ′ = ⌈dℓc2 ln(n/ε1)⌉ makes more sense.
The codelength is then increased by less than 1 symbol, so we hardly notice the difference in the codelength. However,
the proofs we give in Section 3 and 4 are based on ℓ= dℓc2 ln(n/ε1), which corresponds to using dℓ = ℓ/(c2 ln(n/ε1)).
If we take ℓ′ = ⌈ℓ⌉, then we get d′ℓ = ⌈ℓ⌉/(c2 ln(n/ε1))> dℓ (for ℓ /∈ N), so that with the same parameters Z and δ we
may not be able to prove soundness and completeness anymore. In particular, equation (S2) might not be satisfied if dℓ
is increased, since (S2) implies that 4rdℓ ≤ d2z . Increasing the left hand side may violate this bound, if we do not also
increase dz.
The following Theorem takes care of this minor problem, by showing that if we can find a solution to (S1), (S2),
(C1’), (C2) with a fractional codelength ℓ, then we can also find a solution to these inequalities with the integral
codelength ⌈ℓ⌉. In particular, we show which scheme parameters ℓ, Z and δ one could take to achieve this result.
Theorem 7. Let the Tardos scheme be constructed as in Subsection 2.1, and let (dℓ,dz,dδ ,dα ,r,s,g) be a septuple
satisfying conditions (S1), (S2), (C1’), (C2) giving scheme parameters ℓ0 = dℓc2 ln(n/ε1),Z0 = dzc ln(n/ε1) and δ0 =
1/(dδ c). Then the Tardos scheme from Subsection 2.1 with parameters
ℓ= ⌈ℓ0⌉, Z = Z0 +
g
c
(⌈ℓ0⌉− ℓ0) , δ = δ0, (13)
is ε1-sound and ε2-complete.
Proof. Let us write ω = dℓ(⌈ℓ0⌉− ℓ0)/ℓ0. We prove that if the equations hold for (dℓ,dz,dδ ,dα ,r,s,g), then they also
hold for (d′ℓ,d′z,dδ ,d′α ,r,s,g), where d′ℓ = dℓ +ω,d′z = dz + gω,d′α = (d′z +
√
(d′z)2−4rd′ℓ)/2. Since for this set of
parameters we get ℓ,Z and δ as in (13), the result then follows.
First note that since dδ ,s and g did not change, both sides of inequality (C1’) remain the same and this inequality is
still satisfied. For inequality (C2), note that both sides also remained the same, since gd′ℓ−d′z = g(dℓ+ω)−(dz+gω)=
gdℓ−dz. For (S2), we rewrite this inequality as a quadratic inequality in d′α :
(d′α )2 +(−d′z)d′α + rd′ℓ ≤ 0. (14)
This inequality is satisfied if and only if d′α lies between the two roots of x2 +(−d′z)x+ rd′ℓ = 0, which therefore must
exist. These roots exist if and only if (d′z)2−4rd′ℓ ≥ 0. Since we know that d2z −4rdℓ ≥ 0 the inequality follows if
(d′z)2−4rd′ℓ = (d2z −4rdℓ)+(2gdz +g2ω2−4r)≥ d2z −4rdℓ ≥ 0.
From (S2) and (C2) we know that g(d2z ) ≥ g(4rdℓ)≥ 4rdz, i.e. gdz ≥ 4r. So it follows that 2gdz +g2ω2 ≥ 4r, which
proves the second inequality. The third inequality then follows from (S2).
Finally for (S1), we prove that d′α ≥ dα , while the right hand side remains the same, so that this inequality is still
satisfied. Note that dα is also at most the largest root of (14), so d′α −dα is bounded by
d′α −dα ≥
d′z +
√
(d′z)2−4rd′ℓ
2
−
dz +
√
d2z −4rdℓ
2
≥ gω
2
≥ 0.
Here the second inequality follows from earlier calculations that (d′z)2 −4rd′ℓ ≥ d2z −4rdℓ. So this choice of d′α is at
least as high as dα , so inequality (S1) is satisfied. This completes the proof.
3Numerical optimizations show that even a parameter set with dℓ ≈ 81.25 exists that satisfies all requirements of Blayer and Tassa.
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B Proof of Lemma 2
For proving Lemma 2 we will again closely follow the analysis of Blayer and Tassa, and make changes where necessary.
First, we write the total accusation sum of all colluders together as follows:
S =
ℓ
∑
i=1
c
∑
j∈C
S ji =
ℓ
∑
i=1
yi
(
xiqi− c−xiqi
)
+
ℓ
∑
i=1
(1−yi)
(
c−xi
qi
−xiqi
)
.
Here xi is the number of ones on the ith positions of all colluders, yi is the output symbol of the pirates on position
i, and we introduced the notation qi =
√
(1− pi)/pi. Following the analysis from e.g. Blayer and Tassa, and Tardos,
but using that Si = (1− yi)
(
c−xi
qi −xiqi
)
for positions i where yi = 0 (instead of Si = 0, as with the asymmetric score
function), we can bound the expectation value by
E~y,X ,~p
[
e−βS
]
≤
(
c
∑
x=0
(
c
x
)
Mx
)ℓ
, (15)
where
Mx =

E0,x if x = 0,
E1,x if x = c,
max(E0,x,E1,x) otherwise,
and, for some random variable p distributed according to F ,
E0,x = Ep
[
px(1− p)c−xe−β
(
c−x
q −xq
)]
,
E1,x = Ep
[
px(1− p)c−xe−β
(
xq− c−xq
)]
.
Now, using β = s√δ/c, we bound the exponents in E0,x and E1,x as follows.
−s = −βc√
δ
≤−βcq ≤−β
(
xq− c−x
q
)
≤ βc
q
≤ βc√
δ
= s.
So |β (xq− (c− x)/q)| ≤ s for our choice of β . So we can use the inequality ew ≤ 1+w+h−1(s)w2 which holds for
all w ≤ s, with w =±β (xq− (c−x)/q), to obtain
E0,x ≤ Ep
[
px(1− p)c−x
(
1+β
(
xq− c−x
q
)
+h−1(s)β 2
(
xq− c−x
q
)2)]
,
E1,x ≤ Ep
[
px(1− p)c−x
(
1−β
(
xq− c−x
q
)
+h−1(s)β 2
(
xq− c−x
q
)2)]
.
Introducing more notation, this can be rewritten to
E0,x ≤ F0,x +βF1,x +h−1(s)β 2F2,x,
E1,x ≤ F0,x−βF1,x +h−1(s)β 2F2,x,
where
F0,x = Ep
[
px(1− p)c−x] ,
F1,x = Ep
[
px(1− p)c−x
(
xq− c−x
q
)]
,
F2,x = Ep
[
px(1− p)c−x
(
xq− c−x
q
)2]
.
We first calculate F1,x explicitly. Writing out the expectation value and using the definition of f (p) from (1), we get
F1,x =
1
pi−4δ ′
∫ 1−δ
δ
px(1− p)c−x
(
x
p
− c−x
1− p
)
d p
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The primitive of the integrand is given by I(p) = px(1− p)c−x, so we get
F1,x =
I (1−δ )− I(δ )
pi −4δ ′ =
(1−δ )xδ c−x−δ x(1−δ )c−x
pi−4δ ′ . (16)
For 0 < x < c, we bound F1,x from above and below as
−δ x(1−δ )c−x
pi−4δ ′ ≤ F1,x ≤
(1−δ )xδ c−x
pi −4δ ′ .
Using these bounds for Mx, with 0 < x < c, we get
Mx ≤ F0,x +β max(δ
x(1−δ )c−x,(1−δ )xδ c−x)
pi −4δ ′ +h
−1(s)β 2F2,x.
Since δ < 1− δ , the maximum of the two terms is the first term when 0 < x ≤ c/2, and it is the second term when
c/2 < x < c. Note that this bound is different from the one of Blayer and Tassa, since in their analysis they do not have
this maximum over two terms, but just the first of these two terms. We cannot prove the same upper bound as Blayer
and Tassa, and therefore our bound for Mx,0 < x < c, is slightly weaker than Blayer and Tassa’s.
For the positions where the marking assumption applies, i.e. x = 0 and x = c, we do not use the bounds on F1,x, but
use the exact formula from (16) to obtain
M0 ≤ F0,0−β (1−δ )
c −δ c
pi−4δ ′ +h
−1(s)β 2F2,0,
Mc ≤ F0,c−β (1−δ )
c−δ c
pi−4δ ′ +h
−1(s)β 2F2,c.
The value of Mc is the same as that of Blayer and Tassa, but whereas Blayer and Tassa had M0 = F0, we get a lower
upper bound on M0. This is essentially the reason why with the symmetric score function we get shorter codelengths
than Blayer and Tassa.
Substituting the bounds on Mx in the summation over Mx from (15) gives us
c
∑
x=0
(
c
x
)
Mx ≤M0 +Mc +
c−1
∑
x=1
(
c
x
)
Mx
≤
(
F0,0−β (1−δ )
c −δ c
pi−4δ ′ +h
−1(s)β 2F2,0
)
+
(
F0,c−β (1−δ )
c −δ c
pi−4δ ′ +h
−1(s)β 2F2,c
)
+
⌊c/2⌋
∑
x=1
(
c
x
)(
F0,x +β δ
x(1−δ )c−x
pi−4δ ′ +h
−1(s)β 2F2,x
)
+
c−1
∑
x=⌊c/2⌋+1
(
c
x
)(
F0,x +β (1−δ )
xδ c−x
pi −4δ ′ +h
−1(s)β 2F2,x
)
.
Gathering all terms with F0,x and F2,x, and using the substitution x′ = c− x for the summation over ⌈c/2⌉− 1 terms,
we get
c
∑
x=0
(
c
x
)
Mx ≤
c
∑
x=0
(
c
x
)
F0,x−β 2(1−δ )
c
pi −4δ ′ +h
−1(s)β 2
c
∑
x=0
(
c
x
)
F2,x
+
β
pi−4δ ′
(
δ c +
⌊c/2⌋
∑
x=1
(
c
x
)
δ x(1−δ )c−x
)
+
β
pi−4δ ′
(
δ c +
⌈c/2⌉−1
∑
x′=1
(
c
x′
)
δ x′(1−δ )c−x′
)
. (17)
For the summation over F2,x, let us define a sequence of random variables {Ti}ci=1 according to Ti = q with probability
p and Ti = −1/q with probability 1− p. Similar to the inequalities from (5), we get that Ep[Ti] = 0 and Ep[T 2i ] = 1.
Also, since Ti and Tj are independent for i 6= j, we have that Ep[TiTj] = 0 for i 6= j. Therefore we can write
Ep
( c∑
i=1
Ti
)2= c∑
i=1
Ep
[
T 2i
]
+∑
i6= j
Ep
[
TiTj
]
= c.
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But writing out the definition of the expected value, we see that the left hand side is actually the same as the summation
over F2,x, so that we get
Ep
( c∑
i=1
Ti
)2= c∑
x=0
(
c
x
)
px(1− p)c−x
(
xq− c−x
q
)2
=
c
∑
x=0
(
c
x
)
F2,x = c.
Also we trivially have that
c
∑
x=0
(
c
x
)
F0,x =
c
∑
x=0
(
c
x
)
Ep
[
px(1− p)c−x]= Ep
[
c
∑
x=0
(
c
x
)
px(1− p)c−x
]
= 1.
For the summation over ⌊c/2⌋ terms we use the following upper bound, which then also holds for the summation over
⌈c/2⌉−1 terms:
δ c +
⌊c/2⌋
∑
x=1
(
c
x
)
δ x(1−δ )c−x ≤
c
∑
x=1
(
c
x
)
δ x(1−δ )c−x = 1− (1−δ )c ≤ δc.
Note that this first inequality is quite sharp. In most cases δ ≪ 1−δ , so that the summation is dominated by the terms
with low values of x. Adding the terms with ⌊c/2⌋< x < c (i.e. terms with high powers of δ ) to the summation has an
almost negligible effect on the value of the summation.
Now applying the previous results to (17), and using (1−δ )c ≥ 1−δc, which holds for all c, we get
c
∑
x=0
(
c
x
)
Mx ≤ 1−β 2−4cδ
pi−4δ ′ +h
−1(s)β 2c.
We want to prove that, for some g > 0,
c
∑
x=0
(
c
x
)
Mx ≤ 1−β 2−4cδ
pi−4δ ′ +h
−1(s)β 2c ≤ 1−gβ ≤ e−gβ . (18)
Filling in β = s√δ/c and δ = 1/(dδ c) and writing out the second inequality, this leads to the requirement that
2− 4dδ
pi
− h
−1(s)s√
dδ c
≥ g.
This is exactly inequality (C1’), which is assumed to hold. Combining the results from Equations (18) and (17) gives
us
E~y,X ,~p
[
e−βS
]
≤
(
c
∑
x=0
(
c
x
)
Mx
)ℓ
≤ e−gβℓ.
This completes the proof.
C Proof of Theorem 6
We introduce parameters Kg,Kr,Ks, a priori depending on c, to enable us to write
g =
2
pi
−Kgc−1/3, h(r) = Krc−1/3, 1
sh−1(s)
= Ksc−1/3.
Clearly Kg,Kr,Ks are positive, and we will assume that Kg and Kr are O(1) for c → ∞. This assumption will be
validated later on. Note that we do not demand this for Ks (and indeed, it will turn out that Ks → ∞).
Note that r = h−1(Krc−1/3) = 12 +
1
6 Krc
−1/3 +O(c−2/3), so that, with for convenience R = rg , we have
R =
pi
4
+
(
pi2
8 Kg +
pi
12
Kr
)
c−1/3 +O
(
c−2/3
)
. (19)
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Next, for convenience we put D =
√
dδ
c , and then we have from (O1) that D = D0c−1/3, where
D0 =
1
2KgKs
(
1+
√
1+
16
pi
KgK2s
)
.
Note that D0 is a decreasing function of Ks, with limiting value 2√pi
1√
Kg
.
From (O2) we see that dα = max
{
D
h(r) ,x0
}
, where x0 = R+
√
R2 +RD ηs . Note that
x0 = 2R+
1
2
D
η
s
+O
(
c−2/3
)
, (20)
where we used that ηs = o(1). Note that (O3) and (O4) imply dℓ =
d2α+dα D
η
s
g(dα−R) , and that by dα > R we have dℓ ≥
2x0+D ηs
g ,
with equality if and only if dα = x0. So in order to minimize dℓ we minimize
2x0+D ηs
g , and show that there is a solution
to this with dα = x0, which then must be the optimum. For this optimal solution, by (19) and (20) we get
dℓ =
pi2
2
+L0c−1/3 +O(c−2/3), where L0 =
pi3
2
Kg +
pi2
6 Kr +piD0
η
s
. (21)
To find the main terms in the optimal values for dℓ,dz,dδ , for the moment we neglect error terms. The fact that dα = x0
implies that Dh(r) ≤ x0, and this is asymptotically equivalent to D0Kr ≤
pi
2 . This can be expanded into 1+
√
1+ 16pi KgK2s ≤
piKgKrKs, and this leads to (pi3KgK2r −16)Ks ≥ 2pi2Kr, which actually is two conditions:
KgK2r >
16
pi3
= 0.51602 . . . , Ks ≥ 2pi
2Kr
pi3KgK2r −16
. (22)
This shows that it is impossible to choose both Kg and Kr close to 0, and that it is certainly possible to choose them
O(1) as c → ∞. Note that optimizing ηs implies taking s as large as possible, but this means taking Ks as small as
possible, which is limited by the above condition. Indeed, in minimizing L0 we would like to minimize Kg and Kr,
leading to growing Ks, while also s preferably keeps growing. We will see that this is possible.
In optimizing L0, to find the main term we also neglect for the moment the term piD0 ηs , as it also tends to 0. So
we optimize L′0 =
pi3
2 Kg +
pi2
6 Kr under the constraint KgK
2
r >
16
pi3
. The minimal value for L′0 is reached for Kg → γpi ≈
0.11325,Kr → 6γ = 2.1346, where γ = ( 23pi )2/3 ≈ 0.35577 is a convenience constant. In this case KgK2r → 16pi3 , so
Ks → ∞, and D0 → 2√pi 1√Kg → 3piγ ≈ 3.3531. It follows that L
′
0 → 3pi
2
2 γ ≈ 5.2670.
Let us next be more careful, and not throw away the term piD0 ηs and the error terms. L0 as in (21) is a priori a
function of Kg,Kr and s. We can take for Ks its exact optimal value according to (22), viz.
Ks =
2pi2Kr
pi3KgK2r −16
, (23)
so that D0 = pi2 Kr. Note that (23) allows us to eliminate from L0 the variable Kg. This yields
L0 =
pi2
6
(
1+3 η
s
)
Kr +pi2
1
KrKs
+8 1
K2r
.
We now minimize L0 by setting the partial derivatives w.r.t. s and Kr to 0. Indeed, ∂ L0∂ Kr =
pi2
6 (1+3
η
s )−pi2 1K2r Ks −
16 1K3r , and this being 0 implies
pi2
6
(
1+3 η
s
)
K2r −16
1
Kr
= pi2
1
Ks
. (24)
Further, by 1K2s
dKs
ds =− (s−1)e
s+1
s2
c−1/3 we find ∂ L0∂ s =− pi
2
2
η
s2
Kr +pi2 1Kr
(s−1)es+1
s2
c−1/3, and this being 0 implies
K2r =
2
η ((s−1)e
s +1)c−1/3. (25)
From (24) and (25) we eliminate Kr, and thus obtain an equation in s only, viz.(
1+3 η
s
) 1
η3/2
((s−1)es +1)3/2 − 24
√
2
pi2
c1/2 = 3 1
η1/2
es−1− s
s
((s−1)es +1)1/2.
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The first term on the left hand side is ( sesη )
3/2(1+O( 1s )), and the right hand side is
3(es)3/2
(sη)1/2 (1+O(
1
s )), and as η < 1
and s → ∞ the right hand side clearly is smaller, so vanishes in the O( 1s ). So we find ( se
s
η )
3/2(1+O( 1s )) =
24
√
2
pi2
c1/2,
and this yields
ses =
(
8
pi2γ η +O
(
1
logc
))
c1/3.
In turn this implies
s =
1
3 logc− log logc+ log η +O(1),
1
s
=
3
logc
(
1+O
(
log logc
logc
))
, (26)
and
Ks =
pi2γ
72η log
2 c
(
1+O
(
1
logc
))
. (27)
Indeed we find that Ks and s both tend to ∞.
To get the proper value for Kr we turn to (24), and introduce θ such that Kr = 6γ +θ , so that θ will tend to 0. Then
(24) becomes a cubic equation in θ :
θ 3 +18γθ 2 +
(
108γ2 − 6(
1+3 ηs
)
Ks
)
θ +
( 288
pi2
η
s
1+3 ηs
− 36γ(
1+3 ηs
)
Ks
)
= 0. (28)
When s→ ∞ and Ks → ∞, this ultimately becomes θ (θ 2 +18γθ +108γ2) = 0, with the quadratic term being positive
definite, showing that (28) for finite large s has exactly one real solution, which will be close to 0. For this solution we
have, using (26), (27), (
108γ2 +O
(
1
log2 c
))
θ +O(θ 2) =−288
pi2
η
s
(
1+O
(
1
logc
))
,
hence
Kr = 6γ
(
1− η
s
(
1+O
(
1
logc
)))
, Kg =
γ
pi
(
1+2
η
s
(
1+O
(
1
logc
)))
.
Putting everything together, using (26), we find
L0 =
3
2
pi2γ
(
1+6η 1logc (1+o(1))
)
.
The result now easily follows.
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